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1 Abstract 
 
The impact of invasive species has grown substantially in recent years as evident 
by the trends in government expenditures in response to outbreaks. In this paper, 
authors analyze advantages and disadvantages of current government 
compensation measures for invasive species. The conceptual models are built to 
describe the relationship between producers’ utility and the effect of adoption of 
different measures under different observability condition. As a case study, a 
survey is designed to analyze producer behavior in mitigating AI & END 
outbreaks. 
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Invasive species are defined as non-native species and its introduction is likely to 
cause economic and environmental damage. Invasive species may include plants, 
animals, and other organisms such as microbes. Concern regarding the impact of 
invasive species has grown substantially in recent years as evident by the trends in 
government expenditures in response to outbreaks. APHIS (Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service) estimates that annual damage and control costs of invasive species 
and diseases are around 138 billion dollars per year (Pimentel, Zuniga and Morrison, 
2005). There are three major approaches to compensate producers that suffer financial 
loss due to invasive species: (1) Ex post indemnification programs as typically 
administered by APHIS which do not require significant a prior institutional 
infrastructure or producer enrollment, but is costly and less efficient; (2) A prior 
insurance program as offered by RMA (Risk Management Agency) which would 
require enrollment and a government infrastructure with predefine indemnification 
and premium schedules; and (3) Tiered indemnification or insurance design that ties 
higher coverage to explicit risk reducing production practices.   
Risk protection for producers is provided as a risk mitigation program, which 
means that the government provision of indemnification is provided to add economic 
stability for producers, no matter whether it is from an altruistic motive or based on 
industrial policy to avoid economic damage to a particular industry or region. 
Nevertheless, there is no specific model to tell government when and how to use these 
three alternative approaches with reasonable government cost while maximizing the 
3 utility of the producers who suffer from the diseases. This research provides a 
decision model for government policy makers to devise a more efficient policy system 
in fighting invasive diseases. 
The primary goal of this research is to assess how government incentives 
encourage producer behavior in mitigating the spread of invasive diseases. For 
instance, APHIS indemnification is often provided to encourage the reporting of 
diseased animals to decrease the risk of disease spread. Similarly, there are attempts to 
provide incentives for prophylactic efforts which reduce the chance of disease 
occurrence as well as disease spread. These efforts can be considered positive 
externalities that are not fully rewarded in the marketplace.  
This research will also assess the observability of preventive measures 
implemented by producers because their reaction to government policies is very 
important. Because producers could adopt different practices under different 
probabilities of disease infestation, how to predict their behavior and how to control it 
through policy mechanisms is essential for an effective government program. As a 
case study, this research focuses on diseases specific to the poultry industry, AI (Avian 
Influenza) and END (Exotic Newcastle Disease), where we investigate the 
effectiveness of alternative government programs in encouraging optimal disease 
mitigating practices specific to AI and END.   
4 Current management measures   
Here we review alternative government policies that best incentivize behavior 
consistent with the social goals of invasive species management. We will examine 
producer behavior in response to alternative coordinated strategies by the government 
to determine the most efficient strategy with each disease occurrence. Given a disease 
outbreak, should the event be handled by (1) ex post indemnification, (2) insurance, or 
(3) tiered indemnification/insurance. There are certainly instances where each 
approach has merit, and this research will resolve determining when each approach 
should be employed to avoid duplication of effort and expenditures, as well as when a 
particular approach is the most efficient course of action. While multiple programs are 
often used simultaneously, programs such as indemnification and insurance may 
confound each other when used together.   
An ex post indemnity is a sum paid by government to producers by way of 
compensation for a particular loss caused by an invasive species. With ex post 
indemnification, the government can avoid the creation of institutions and programs 
which is particularly efficient when the probability of loss faced by producers is quite 
small. At an early stage of infestation, producer inexperience could lead to an 
underestimation of disease risk, resulting in little or no willingness to pay for 
insurance. Thus, indemnification may be the best course of the action at this stage of 
infestation and spread. Although ex post indemnification programs do not require 
significant prior infrastructure, the ad hoc nature of these programs often results in 
inefficient or inequitable indemnities (Ott, 2006). 
5 Ex ante insurance is defined as the transfer of the risk of a loss, from one entity 
to another, in exchange for a premium. Insurance requires institutionalized premiums 
and indemnity structures for insurable risks. With insurance, losses should, at least in 
principle, take place at a known time, in a known place, and from a known cause. At 
more advanced stages of infestation and spread, the probability of loss increases. 
Producers have more direct experience with losses and are likely to have a positive 
willingness to pay for insurance. Assuming insurability, insurance may be the most 
efficient government response at this stage of infestation spread. Insurance allows 
producers and government officials to define an efficient and equitable program 
because more time is available to define and implement the program. An insurance 
program has the potential to reduce government cost by charging premiums. However, 
low participation may be a problem, particularly if the probability and economic cost 
of occurrence is low. Low participation may also be exacerbated by adverse selection 
or moral hazard when significant asymmetric information exists between the insurer 
and insured (Shaik et al., 2006).   
In considering ex post indemnification and ex ante insurance, tiered 
indemnification or insurance, a modification of the previous two designs, may 
increase incentives for producer to implement disease mitigating practices. Instead of 
fixed compensation from a government indemnification or insurance program, the 
amount of compensation the producer receives becomes a function of their behavior. 
For example, when the producers adopt certain preventive practices they receive 
“full” indemnification, otherwise they receive a lower level of indemnification. The 
6 merit of tiered indemnification or insurance is that producers have a stronger incentive 
to adopt prevention measures. However, the disadvantage of a tiered design is that it 
requires a level of observability in order to be effective.   
 
Conceptual Model 
In this section, we describe how the producers are influenced by the following 
factors: input and output prices, input and output quantities, errors in evaluating the 
probability of loss, indemnification levels, the percentage of losses indemnified, and 
insurance premiums. Optimal producer behavior is assumed to result from the 
expected utility maximization problem. Additionally, their utility is conditioned on the 
initial wealth plus total revenue, minus their total cost, when there is no invasive 
species occurrence. The solution to this problem is a set of choices over inputs that are 
potentially both risk increasing and decreasing and are conditional upon the perceived 
risk, exogenous risk, and individual risk preferences. Indemnification and insurance 
programs can be added to this model by incorporating an indemnity function and 
premiums. For ex post indemnification, producers do not need to pay up-front cost to 
receive government indemnification. In contrast, with insurance, premiums are an 
expense to producers which should be subtracted revenue in the model. The 
indemnification function equals a portion of the total loss (in value). As typical, a 
deductible reflects the portion of losses incurred by the producer. A tiered 
indemnification system conditional on risk mitigating inputs can be modeled by 
making the deductible level a function of the risk decreasing inputs. When producers 
7 use certain risk decreasing inputs, they can get a lower deductible which increases the 
level of indemnification. The observability of certain behaviors is another factor 
which should be included in the model, as both ex post indemnification and insurance 
programs will face the moral hazard problem. Thus, the successful application of 
tiered indemnification will be affected by the observability of risk decreasing 
behavior.  
Insurance Model 
With insurance, producer behavior is a function of premiums, which are defined 
as PR; the probability of occurrence of invasive species is defined asρ, and other 
variables. Other variables include: x (input measure); x1 is input when producers 
perform certain prevention measures; x0 is input when producers do not perform 
certain prevention measures; r is the price of inputs; Wo is initial welfare of producers; 
P is price of output; Y is quantity of output; C is cost; d is indemnification level; L is 
the disease loss; δ is a dummy variable where δ = 1 when producers do x1, δ = 0 
otherwise.  
The utility maximization problem for the producer is specified as follows: 
(1)  
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In equation (1), the utility of the producer is represented by two alternatives. The first 
two lines represent when a producer does not execute certain prevention measures (δ 
= 0). At same time, the probability of occurrence of an invasive species outbreak is 
8 ρ(x0 ) instead ofρ(x1 ). Thus, 1-ρ(x0 ) is the probability that an invasive species 
outbreak will not happen. When no invasive species outbreak occurs, there is no loss 
for the producer and no indemnification; on the other hand, when an invasive species 
outbreak does occur, the producers will suffer a loss L, as well as get indemnification, 
which is represented by (1-d)L.  
Ex post indemnification Model 
With ex post indemnification, the expected utility function does not include 
premiums (PR) and (1) could be respecified as 
(2)  
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The difference between (1) ex ante insurance and (2) ex post indemnification is that 
the producers do not pay premiums in order to get compensation when an outbreak 
occurs. 
Tiered indemnification or insurance 
For tiered indemnification or insurance, the indemnification is no longer a 
constant, but a function of the discrete input choice x. x may take a value equal either 
zero or one, depending on whether the risk mitigating input is chosen. Premiums, PR 
are a function of x, such that PR(x1) < PR(x0). The insurance deductible (d) is 
conditional on the government observation of x such that d(x1) < d(x0). Thus, a 
producer pays a lower deductive and receives higher indemnification coverage with xl. 
The utility maximization problem with tiered indemnification or insurance with 
9 complete observability on the part of the government is specified as (with 
indemnification PR = 0) 
(3)  
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In (3), if producers do x1 it is assumed that their behavior can be observed. 
Correspondingly, they pay d(x1) and PR(x1) in the event of an outbreak.     
Lastly, we consider the option of tiered indemnification or insurance when x is 
not completely observable. This is reflected by the parameter γ in (4) which is the 
probability that the government mistakenly assumes x = x1 when in fact x = x0. In 
other words, the government mistakenly assumes the producer has implemented 
certain preventive measures. Given incomplete observability, the utility maximization 
problem can be written as   
(4)    
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      The third and forth lines in (4) represent the case where the producer does x0 and it 
is correctly realized by the government. The forth and fifth lines describe the case 
where the producer does x0 and the government believes the producers has done x1.  
10 Data Collection and Survey Design 
A survey is designed where we focus on producer behavior in mitigating 
outbreaks of critical poultry diseases high pathogenic avian influenza, the H5 and H7 
subtypes of low pathogenic avian influenza which can mutate into high-path, and 
Exotic Newcastle disease because these diseases have had or could have substantial 
economic impacts on the poultry industry. Additionally, there already are different 
levels of experience with these different diseases, ranging from virtually no 
experience to moderate levels of experience. This allows an examination of risk 
perceptions based on different experience levels with a disease, as well as the 
potential for management to mitigate these risks. The survey questions are based on 
AI (Avian Influenza) and END (Exotic Newcastle Disease). Experts in the poultry 
field are asked to respond to the survey because they have a lot of experience in 
invasive species issues   
In the survey design, we include two parts: the first section provides background 
information and context, which gives the experts a presumed production environment 
and a description of several risk decreasing measures which include the following:   
1)  Avoid taking birds away from the premises and returning them during an 
AI outbreak. 
2)  All flocks should be fenced or confined in order to avoid contact with any 
wild birds, especially waterfowl. 
3)  Introduce new stock only from sources known to be AI free and not from 
areas in or near an AI outbreak zone.   
11 4)  Anyone on the site must wear rubber boots, and wear them only on his/her 
premises to avoid ‘tracking in’ disease. 
5)  All dead birds must be disposed of on the farm in a bio-secure manner.   
6)  Eggs must be held on the premise until the farm is released from 
quarantine.  
7)  Before another generation of chickens enters the farm, wash and sanitize 
the chicken house. 
The second part of the survey asks for probability assessments. Questions are 
repeated for each practice. An example practice is “Avoid taking birds to (or bringing 
birds home from) the premises during an AI outbreak.” Questions related to this 
practice are expressed below:   
1)  Assuming the company and each production unit have done every 
measurement perfectly, how many AI outbreaks would you expect the 
company to incur on the 1,000 units during the next year?   
2)  Assuming the company and each production unit have done all the 
measurements except “Avoid taking birds to (or bringing birds home) from 
the premises during an AI outbreak”, what is the probability of an out 
break for this company?   
3)  Assuming the company and each production unit have done all the 
measurements except the measure “Avoid taking birds to (or bringing birds 
home) from the premises during an AI outbreak”, what is the probability of 
the out break for this company?   
12 4)  Consider typical industry practices what is the probability a company will 
consistently follow the practice “Avoid taking birds to (or bringing birds 
home) from the premises during an AI outbreak.” From scale 0 to 100 (0 is 
no change at all and 100 is absolute certainty), what is the probability each 
practice will be followed consistently during the previous 12 months?   
5)  If AI outbreaks in this company’s production unit and APHIS inspector 
want to investigate the reason. What is the probability the inspectors can 
accurately assess whether “Avoid taking birds to (or bringing birds home) 
from the premises during an AI outbreak”, was followed during the 
previous 12 months?   
6)  Assume APHIS was to randomly check 10 of the 1000 units each year with 
an unannounced visit. Each of the 11 measures would be examined. If 
violations were observed the company would be fined $10,000. What is 
the probability the inspectors can accurately assess whether “Avoid taking 
birds to (or bringing birds home) from the premises during an AI outbreak”, 
was followed during the previous 12 months?   
7)  Assume the company and each production unit knows that if an outbreak 
occur and APHIS concludes the facility has not followed all listed 
practices no indemnity will be paid. What is the probability of an outbreak 
for this company?   
13 8)  Assuming the company and each production unit knows that APHIS will 
do random spot checks of 10 facilities each year. What is the probability of 
an outbreak for this company?   
Finally, some questions are aimed to get some general industry information. 
1)  The average industry fixed cost for a one thousand bird production unit is 
how much? 
2)  When an invasive species outbreak occurs, what will be the loss level, for 
example, what percentage of total bird should be eradicated? 
 
Conclusions and Future Research   
This paper describes the current measures used by USDA to mitigate the risk of 
invasive disease in livestock such as Avian Influenza and makes comparison of 
different measures. Then, by building conceptual models for each measure under 
different observability condition, this paper reflects the relationship between producer 
utility and the adoption of different preventive measures. The results of this research 
will show how the government can control producer behavior by choosing the 
appropriate policy to induce disease mitigation. While it is expected that 
indemnification will be the best course of the action in the beginning stages of 
infestation and spread, when producers have more direct experience with losses, there 
may be a positive willingness to pay for insurance. In cases when insuring risk would 
likely be fraught with moral hazard issues, how to improve observability of producers 
would be a critical issue. 
14 In the further research, the conceptual model proposed will be used to derive 
analytical results with respect to the key decision variables. The results of the 
conceptual model will be used to develop simulation models of END and AI; however, 
the results can also be used to form specific testable hypotheses about whether 
existing programs are consistent with derived results for various species in different 
stage of spread and development. The empirical model will be parameterized using 
data gathered as described above to investigate the magnitude of the impacts with 
respect to key variables. The empirical model will also be used to conduct sensitivity 
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